Testimonial Liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals, (forthcoming), Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02244-1 (open access)

I defend testimonial liberalism—the view that, absent defeaters, one may believe that p on mere say-so—from the well-known 'gullibility' objection. Roughly, the worry is that the view is too permissive; one enjoys an absence of defeaters in all sorts of cases in which one ought not to believe. In response, I argue that the well-known distinction between positive and negative epistemic measures can be leveraged in defence of the liberal. Once we get clear on the idea that, as epistemic agents, we need to strike a good balance between the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of error, we see that: (i) the gullibility objection is defused; and, to that extent, (ii) the liberal view on testimonial justification is stronger than has been appreciated. 

"Friendly" Men and Social Roles, (2024), Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 10 (1/2). Article 11.

In 1983, Andrea Dworkin argued that we won't put an end to the culture of rape unless men take responsibility for it. In this paper I search for a theory of collective responsibility that can vindicate Dworkin's sentiment. I argue that by combining Robin Zheng's (2018) role-ideal model of responsibility with Charlotte Witt's (2011) conception of gender as a mega social role, we find a philosophically satisfying theory of what it means to say, with Dworkin, that men are responsible for the culture of rape.