Publications
Publications
Testimonial Liberalism and the balance of epistemic goals, (2024), Philosophical Studies, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-024-02244-1 (open access)
I defend testimonial liberalism—the view that, absent defeaters, one may believe that p on mere say-so—from the well-known 'gullibility' objection. Roughly, the worry is that the view is too permissive; one enjoys an absence of defeaters in all sorts of cases in which one ought not to believe. In response, I argue that the well-known distinction between positive and negative epistemic measures can be leveraged in defence of the liberal. Once we get clear on the idea that, as epistemic agents, we need to strike a good balance between the pursuit of truth and the avoidance of error, we see that: (i) the gullibility objection is defused; and, to that extent, (ii) the liberal view on testimonial justification is stronger than has been appreciated.
"Friendly" Men and Social Roles, (2024), Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 10 (1/2). Article 11.
In 1983, Andrea Dworkin argued that we won't put an end to the culture of rape unless men take responsibility for it. In this paper I search for a theory of collective responsibility that can vindicate Dworkin's sentiment. I argue that by combining Robin Zheng's (2018) role-ideal model of responsibility with Charlotte Witt's (2011) conception of gender as a mega social role, we find a philosophically satisfying theory of what it means to say, with Dworkin, that men are responsible for the culture of rape.
Trust’s meno problem: Can the doxastic view account for the value of trust? (2023), Philosophical Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2023.2206837 (open access).
Arnon Keren (2020) gestures toward a new objection to the doxastic view of trust—the view that trust essentially involves belief. The worry calls into question the doxastic view's ability to explain the distinct and indispensable value of trust. I take up Keren's challenge. I firstly contextualise and elucidate the problem; then, I disambiguate between multiple interpretations in pursuit of the most challenging; finally, I countenance some insights from Katherine Hawley's (2012; 2019) work on trust to offer a solution.
Email me if you'd like to discuss any of these, or see a draft.
1) A paper on testimony and inquiry. (Under review)
Abstract: We epistemically depend on one another in a range of ways beyond the mere exchange of propositional knowledge. It is argued that traditional frameworks in the epistemology of testimony fail to account for this thought, and that a novel, inquiry-centric alternative does better. If we think of testimony not as a source of belief but rather as a resource in inquiry, we begin to do justice to the rich plurality of roles that it plays in our epistemic lives.
2) A paper on epistemic norms and conversation.
Abstract: Standard approaches to the normativity of assertion draw a sharp line between epistemic and pragmatic norms. The former governs our conduct in accordance with standards such as truth, knowledge, and evidential support, whereas the latter governs it in accordance with standards such as relevance, clarity, and manner. This article challenges that picture. Focusing on Grice’s conversational maxims as a canonical articulation of the epistemology-pragmatics divide, I argue that there are genuine epistemic norms captured by all Gricean maxims, not just Quality, as is standardly assumed. To reach this conclusion, I draw on familiar resources for theorising both about epistemic normativity in general and the epistemic normativity of assertion in particular. I then sketch a way of embracing Gricean epistemic norms that avoids some key objections. If I’m right, the upshot is significant: the boundary between epistemology and pragmatics must be reconsidered, as the two domains are far more tightly intertwined than has hitherto been assumed.
3) A paper on therapeutic trust.
Abstract: Is trust belief-like or action-like in its relation to reasons and choice? Debates have centred on cases of therapeutic trust—in which one appears able to choose to trust for practical or moral reasons. Such cases have generated a dialectical impasse: intuitions pull both ways, and verdicts often track antecedent commitments regarding the nature of trust itself. I argue that this impasse reflects a methodological error. Both sides should agree that trust, whether or not therapeutic instances exemplify it, is a reasons-responsive attitude. As such, theory-neutral constraints on question-settling, rational governance, and evaluative normativity can be brought to bear on the debate. I argue that such considerations favour belief-like views over action-like alternatives. I then explain why therapeutic trust debate nevertheless posed a genuine puzzle, and show how belief-like views can offer a positive account of trust’s rational control without invoking voluntariness and choice. The result is a principled, alternative approach that advances the debate beyond intuition-driven case analysis and clarifies trust’s position within the broader nexus of reasons-responsive attitudes.